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This interpretation may have public appeal when applied to the
facts in the Saunders case, because it would prevent the deserting wife
from being treated as a deserving widow.34
It is submitted, however, that the legislature chose language that
is clear and unambiguous. The divorce decree does not take effect
until six months after its date.3 5 The Saunders case follows the settled
law of the District of Columbia. A divorce decree is ineffective to dis-
solve the marriage until the expiration of six months. The death of
either party during the mandatory waiting period abates the divorce
action, and entitles the surviving party, whether guilty or innocent, to
share in the estate of the deceased.
RAYMOND HrNRY VIZETIIANN, JR.
RECOVERY FOR INJURY CAUSING DEATH OF
UNBORN CHILD
The question whether a cause of action for the benefit of the next
of kin exists for the negligently caused death of an unborn child in-
volves problems of damages, multiple recovery, and causation. These
problems are becoming more important in view of the trend towards
allowing recovery under wrongful death and survival statutes for
the negligently caused death of the stillborn fetus.1 At least thirteen
states have allowed such recovery in the last fifteen years.2
gressional purpose and the underlying public policy is fully satisfied without the
illogical and incongruous results we now feel compelled to reach here. Except for
the restraint on remarriage during the six month waiting period, the parties should
be regarded for all other purposes as divorced persons." Ibid.
"Supra note 2. Desertion or abandonment has been held to be a complete bar
to any right to share in the estate of the deceased spouse. In re Lodge's Estate,
287 Pa. 184, 134 Ad. 472 (1926).
3Supra note 3.
1Lambert, History and Future of Wrongful Death and Survivorship, in Wrong-
ful Death and Survivorship ig (Beall ed. 1958).
2In 1948 there were no cases allowing recovery for injury causing a child to be
stillborn. In 1949 Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) al-
lowed such a cause of action. Since then a marked trend has developed, Prosser,
Torts 357 (3d ed. 1964). Those states which have allowed recovery include: Wendt
v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 196o); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256,
1S A.2d 448 (Super. Ct. 1962); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 5o Del. 258, 128
A.2d 557 (Super. Ct. 1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955);
Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143,
368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d gol (Ky. 1955); Valence v. Louis-
iana Power & Light Co., 5o So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1951); State v. Sherman, 234
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Two cases recently decided under Pennsylvania law illustrate some
of the problems. In Gullborg v. Rizzo, 3 a diversity action, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously held that
there are causes of action under both the Pennsylvania Wrongful
Death 4 and Survival Acts5 for the wrongful death of a viable fetus,
as the result of an automobile accident.
Two months later the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Carroll
v. Sklof, 6 a case similar to Gullborg v. Rizzo, unanimously denied
recovery in a suit against a physician for negligently causing the
death of a viable fetus while operating on a pregnant woman.
In both principal cases the decisions were based on whether the
child had ever had a personal injury cause of action,7 since under the
Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Acts, a right to a personal
action arising out of the tortious incident must have existed in the
decedent prior to death.8
The Court of Appeals in Gullborg thought that the stillborn child
had had a cause of action against the defendant. In an effort to follow
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins9 it pointed out that the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court had previously recognized the separate exist-
ence of the unborn child in Sinkler v. Kneale0 and had allowed re-
Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954);
Poliquin v. MacDonald, ioi N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore,
1O9 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 1o6 (1959); Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42
(S.C. 1964).
3331 F.2d 557 (3 d Cir.)
"'Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and
no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the
widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives
may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned." Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 16oi (1953).
r"All causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, except actions for sland-
er or libel, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the
death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 32o.6o1
(1950).
0415 Pa. 47, 2o2 A.2d 9 (1964).
1 n Carroll the court said that the wrongful death cause of action "is ground-
ed upon an existing personal cause of action which the deceased could have had
but did not institute during his or her lifetime." In Gullborg the court studied
previous Pennsylvania decisions on whether a child has an action for prenatal in-
juries in an attempt to decide whether an action may exist before birth in an un-
born child under Pennsylvania law.
"Berry v. Franklin Plate Glass Corp., 66 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa. 1946); Howard
v. Bell Tel. Co., 3o6 Pa. 518, 16o At. 613 (1932); Hoodmacher v. Lehigh Valley
R.R., 218 Pa. 21, 66 At. 975 (i906); Hughes v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 176 Pa.
254, 35 Ad. 19o (1896).
03o4 U.S. 64 (1938).
104o Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
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covery for prenatal injuries. Sinkler established that any fetus has a
separate existence as a person sufficient to maintain an action for his
prenatal injuries if he is born alive. The Court of Appeals reasoned
that if the unborn child has a right to an action for prenatal injuries
once he is born alive, this cause of action exists from the time of the
injury. Without distinguishing between the live birth in Sinkler and
the stillbirth in Guliborg, the Court of Appeals concluded that under
Pennsylvania law an unborn child has a cause of action for personal
injuries prior to birth;" hence the administrator of the stillborn child
had a cause of action for wrongful death.
The Supreme Court in Carroll v. Skloff did not follow the rea-
soning used in Gullborg v. Rizzo.12 In its opinion the court said that
"the present case is patently and materially different"'13 from Sinkler
v. Kneale in which the child was born alive. The court in Carroll
said that the wrongful death action was derivative, and so dependent
on decedent's right to a personal injury cause of action before his
stillbirth. But the court concluded that the unborn child "quite ob-
viously" 14 does not have a cause of action for personal injuries prior
to birth. In effect, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania maintained that
the unborn child who is injured acquires an inchoate right to an ac-
tion for personal injuries, subject to his birth alive.15
Additionally, the court pointed out that the Wrongful Death Act
says that any amount recovered shall go to certain named heirs "in
the proportion they would take his or her personal estate in case of
'The court said, "[W]e think that Sinkler has indicated that Pennsylvania
would align itself with the preponderant view;" the preponderant view presumably
being to allow recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. Gullborg V.
Rizzo, supra note 3, at 56o.
"At the time the brief for appellant was written the Gullborg case was on ap-
peal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. It was, however, mentioned
frequently in appellant's belief on the basis of the District Court's decision to
allow recovery.
"Carroll v. Skloff, supra not 6, at lo.
"Id. at 13. See also, Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221, 225
(1958).
'The argument that the unborn child's rights are inchoate or conditioned upon
his live birth is derived from intestacy law under which an unborn child may receive
property subject to his live birth. The Carroll case is not the first time the "inchoate"
idea has been applied in the case of an unborn child's death. In Puhl v. Milwaukee
Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 16g, 17o (i96o), the court said: "There is
much that can be said for the biological theory. At least it is a more logical view.
Under this theory an unborn infant is not treated as a legal person but as a sep-
arate entity or human being in the biological sense from conception having a poten-
tiality or personality which is not realized until birth. Injuries suffered before birth
impose a conditional liability on the tortfeasor. This liability becomes uncondi-
tional, or complete, upon the birth of the injured separate entity as a legal person."
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intestacy...."16 But under Pennsylvania law a stillborn fetus cannot
have an estate, since a fetus enventre sa mere may take property by
descent or devise only if subsequently born alive.17 The inclusion in
the Wrongful Death Act of this reference to the intestacy statute in-
dicates that the legislature did not intend that a wrongful death ac-
tion should exist for the negligently caused death of an unborn child.
In agreement with the generally accepted rule' s Pennsylvania case
law limits recovery in a wrongful death action to the pecuniary loss
occasioned by the death.19 Mental distress and the sentimental value
of the child are not recognized as elements of damage in the wrongful
death action2 0 except by a small minority of states.
21
The pecuniary loss under the Pennsylvania rule is determined by
subtracting the probable cost of supporting the child from the net
present value of decedent's earnings and services during his minority.
22
Under the general rule the beneficiaries might also recover those bene-
fits which they might reasonably expect from decedent's earnings
and services after his minority.23 Specific proof of financial loss in an
action for the wrongful death of a child is not necessary; 24 it is suf-
mPa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1602 (1953).
'7Martin's Estate, 3 Pa. County Ct. 212 (1887). See Hogan v. McDaniel, 2o4
Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221, 225 (1958).
2'Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 492 (1950) lists twenty states using the pecuniary loss
theory of damages. See generally 16 Minn. L. Rev. 409, 410 (1932) where it is said:
"The fundamental principle upon which damages are assessed under the typical
statute is that of pecuniary loss...."
2Vincent v. City of Philadelphia, 348 Pa. 290, 35 A.2d 65 (1944); Caldwell v.
Brown, 53 Pa. 453 (1867); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. 318 (1858).
'Vincent v. City of Philadelphia, 348 Pa. 290, 35 A.2d 65 (1944); Hyland v.
Werner, 6 Sch. Reg. 210 (1940); McCormick, Damages § ioi at 355 (1935); Annot.,
14 A.L.R.2d 485, 495 (1950)-
-"This minority includes four states: Miami Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Tinsley, 121
Fla. 774, 164 So. 528 (1935); Aymond v. Western Union Tel. Co., 151 La. 184, 91
So. 671 (1922); R. F. Trant, Inc. v. Upton, 159 Va. 355, 165 S.E. 404 (1932); Black
v. Peerless Elite Laundry Co., 113 W. Va. 828, 169 S.E. 447 (1933).
uDattola v. Burt Bros., Inc., 288 Pa. 134, 135 At. 736 (1927); Cosgrove v. Hay,
54 Pa. Super. 175 (1913); McCleary v. Pittsburg Rys., 47 Pa. Super. 366 (1911).
n3Zeller v. Reid, 38 Cal. App. 2d 622, 101 P.2d 730 (1940); Williams v. Hoyt, 117
Me. 61, 102 Ad. 703 (1917); Chapman v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 137 S.W.2d 612 (Mo.
App. 1940) (stating Illinois rule); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 506 (1950).
24Burns v. Eminger, 84 Mont. 397, 276 Pac. 437 (1929); Hicks v. Love, 2oi N.C.
773, 161 S.E. 394 (1931); Kurn v. Youngblood, 193 Okla. 299, 142 P.2d 983 (1943);
Atrops v. Costello, 8 Wash. 149, 35 Pac. 62o (1894). There has been some uncertainty
about the Pennsylvania rule on specific proof of damages caused by a child's death.
Kost v. Ashland Borough, 236 Pa. 164, 84 Ad. 691 (1912) held that specific proof
was necessary to sustain damages. But in Ginocchi v. Pittsburgh 8- L.E.R.R., 283 Pa.
378, 129 Ad. 323 (1925) the court held specific proof of damages occasioned by the
young boy's death was not necessary. It now appears that the Ginocchi case is be-
ing followed. See McCleary v. Pittsburg Rys., 47 Pa. Super. 366 (1911).
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ficent to show the child's age, sex, physical and mental condition,
together with evidence of the parents' circumstances in life.2 5
But even these scant proofs are unavailable in the case of the still-
born child.2 6 While all wrongful death actions involve speculation and
uncertainty in arriving at the damages, cases involving stillborn chil-
dren involve unreasonable and arbitrary speculation since there is
no evidence concerning the child's capabilities and potentialities.
27
To award damages so speculative is to punish the tortfeasor rather than
to compensate the plaintiff.2 8 While it has been argued that the prob-
lem of speculative damages should be dealt with on a case by case ba-
sis, 29 in Graf v. TaggertO the court rejected this line of reasoning be-
cause damages resulting from the stillbirth were "uniformly" very spec-
ulative. Strong doubts have also been expressed concerning the reality
of pecuniary loss to the parents caused by a child's death, since few
children today earn enough money or expend enough of their services
to offset the expense of maintaining them.
31
Because pecuniary loss is rarely suffered by the parents of the
stillborn child, a substantial recovery indicates that its real basis
is the sentimental value to the parents and their mental distress.
32
There is some danger of duplication of recovery3 3 with that obtained
by the woman.3
4
In Carroll v. Skloff the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania mentioned
-Wierzorek v. Ferris, 176 Cal. 353, 167 Pac. 234 (1917); Williams v. Hines,
229 S.W. 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921); Holland v. Adams, 227 S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921).
'Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 2o4 A.2d 140 (1964); Butler v. Manhattan Ry.,
143 N.Y. 417, 38 N.E. 454 (1894).
"tFiner v. Nichols, 158 Mo. App. 529, 138 S.W. 889 (1911); Berg v. New York
Soc'y, 136 N.YS.2d 528 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
'Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 2o4 A.2d 140 (1964); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47,
2o2 A.2d 9 (1964).
'Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death, 15
Rutgers L. Rev. 61, 78 (1960).
3'43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
"INorman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178, 181 (Dist. Ct. App.
1954); McCormick, Damages § ioi at 354 (1935); Comment, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 538,
548 (1955).
1In Skeels v. Davidson, 18 Wash. 2d 358, 139 P.2d 301 (1943), a case involving
worngful death of a mentally and physically subnormal boy in constant need of
expensive care, the court reaffirmed the pecuniary loss doctrine and then sustained
a verdict of $1,125 upon the basis that defendant's negligence caused the boy's
death. See Comment, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 538, 549 (1955)-
'See Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954);
Durrett v. Owens, 371 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. 1963); Carroll v. Skloff, supra note 6.
mSnow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933); Smith v. Overby, 3o Ga. 241
(186o).
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"the inherent complex problems incident to causation"35 which are
involved in a wrongful death action for a stillborn child. This proof
would seem to be little different from that required in a woman's ac-
tion for injuries in connection with a miscarriage. Once the normalcy
of the fetus, its development prior to the accident, and the shortness
of the interval between the injury and external signs of miscarriage
have been established, causation is usually established.36
The speculative nature of the damages and the possibility of dupli-
cation of recoveries seem sufficient reasons to deny a cause of action
for the death of an unborn child.
JEROME TURNER
zSupra Note 6, at ii.
;Note, no U. Pa. L. Rev. 554, 577 (1962).
